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Trade Secrets, Property, and Social Relations
STEVEN WILF*
I. INTRODUCTION
A loyal and competent employee works for a large corporation. Like
many others in executive positions, she has been privy to some of the most
valuable information held by the company. This individual has partici-
pated in a variety of employee trade secret awareness programs. In the
course of these programs, she has been warned about unauthorized disclo-
sure. Following procedures set out in a trade secret security policy manual,
the corporation's security office keeps a list of the information accessible
to each employee; the office has control to permit only limited access to
parts of the facility and to computer files for specially authorized employ-
ees; and employees working at home require prior permission to remove
files. Regular reminders are posted on bulletin boards, printed in the com-
pany newsletter, and attached at the end of each email concerning the dis-
closure of proprietary information. The company trade secret plan includes
a requirement that employees periodically sign agreements acknowledging
access to trade secret information; awareness of company policy to protect
this information; a promise not to disclose or misappropriate the informa-
tion; and a requirement to immediately report to the company all unau-
thorized disclosures or uses of the information.1
Due to a sudden downturn in the economy, and much to the surprise of
the employee who has performed well within the company, she is called
into her immediate supervisor's office and suddenly fired. In order to pre-
vent her from copying files without authorization, the hard drive of her
computer is immediately impounded. The files are checked to determine
the full scope of her trade secret access. The employee must clean out her
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
See, eg., Michael A. Epstein, /ft 's the Real Thing, Guard It Carefully: How Companies Can
Protect Trade Secrets, N.Y.LJ., Nov. 22, 1993, LEXIS, Legnew Library, Nylawj File.
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desk within an hour, so there will be limited opportunity to remove pro-
prietary information. Any files downloaded will be carefully checked.
During the course of an exit interview, the employee is again warned about
disclosure; made aware of criminal and civil penalties for wrongful disclo-
sure; and asked to contact the company should there be any questions about
post-employment confidentiality responsibilities and the scope of the pro-
prietary information. Moreover, as an additional precautionary measure,
the employee has been asked to sign a covenant promising not to disclose
or misuse trade secret information.
When this employee finds herself seeking further employment, she
may be facing restricted opportunities based upon a covenant not to com-
pete,2 which might have been signed when she first became an employee of
the company. Accordingly, she may experience even more severely the
adverse effects of dismissal. If this employee does transmit proprietary
information from her past employer to a third party, she may be liable for a
wide range of penalties, both civil and criminal, because she has breached
the duty of trust reposed in her by the employer.3 It seems ironic to speak
of a breach of trust in such situations, for indeed the relationship was
fraught with suspicion, and with conflicting interests. Yet this case of trade
secret doctrine, like so many aspects of employment law as a whole, rests
upon the traditional master-servant relationship, and traditional notions of
loyalty.' This obligation is phrased as a "duty of trust and confidence."5
Even after dismissal, the employee owes a continuing affirmative duty of
confidentiality to her prior employer.' Like a Harold Pinter play, then,
protection of trade secrets is predicated upon employment relationships
that have at their core fundamental issues of loyalty and betrayal. Loyalty,
trade secret doctrine suggests, is the sinew that connects corporations and
2 A covenant not to compete is "[a]n agreement, generally part of a contract of employment or a
contract to sell a business, in which the covenantor agrees for a specific period of time and within a
particular area to refrain from competition with the covenantee." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 329 (5th
ed. 1979).
3 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2000) (setting forth both a monetary fine and imprisonment as
penalties for disclosure of a trade secret); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2 & 3, 14 U.LA. 449-56
(1990 & Supp. 2001) (setting for injunctive relief and damages as remedies for disclosure of a trade
secret).
4 Se e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 396(b) (1958).
Unless otherwise agreed, after termination of the agency, the agent: ... has a duty to the
principal not to use or disclose to third persons on his own account or on account of others,
in competition with the principal or to his injury, trade secrets, written lists of names, or
other similar confidential matters given to him only for the principal's use or acquired by
the agent in violation of duty.
Id.
5 Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment,
and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800-1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441,443 (2001).
6 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 396(b) (1958).
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individuals who work together. Law orders--as it does in marriage and
divorce-the aftermath of failed or simply altered relationships.
In her article, Katherine V.W. Stone analyzes the shifting expectations
of loyalties that create the underpinnings for employment-based trade se-
cret law.7 According to Stone, nineteenth-century employers adopted
mechanisms that served to bind employees to companies.8 Loyalty was
encouraged through hierarchical vertical labor structures that provided for
step-by-step progress up a career ladder within companies, and rewarded
loyalty; training was assumed under the umbrella of the company itself;
and promotion took place in orderly fashion with step-like increases in
salary.9 Most importantly, there was often an implied promise of job secu-
rity The classic example of this paradigm was International Business
Machines ("IBM"), which once frequently advertised to potential hires that
it never had a layoff in its history." Rather than risk the turnover of expe-
rienced employees and perhaps even sabotage, as had occurred earlier, a
psychological contract-to use Stone's term-was formulated to reinvig-
orate the older terms of master-servant loyalty. 2
Stone argues that a new psychological contract, which emerged in the
late 1970s, has recently altered employment practices. 3 The labor shortage
of the United States post-war boom years, which encouraged lifetime em-
ployment, was replaced by free trade and highly competitive international
business markets which demanded agile hiring to meet needs. 4 In addi-
tion, companies retreated from investing in the layered managerial struc-
tures required to organize internal labor markets; rather, the skills required
for the new information economy demanded flexible individuals who
brought experience from elsewhere. 5 Large corporations no longer held
out the implied promise of life-long employment. Instead, employment
relationships became contingent, and the relationship marked by employ-
ees migrating from one opportunity to another with different employers.'
In lieu of job security, employees are provided with training in order to
7 See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Hu-
man Capital in the Changing Worlplace, 34 CoNN. L. REv. 721 (2002).
8 Id. 725-26.
91d.
10 Id.
11 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and Technology: Implications
for Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. LJ. 1, 10 (2001).
12 See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Chanfng Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L RE'. 519 (2001).
Stone, supra noteq, at 730-32.
14 Id. at 727.
15 Id. at 726.
'
61d.
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ensure their employability. 7 Employers gain by having an increasingly
flexible, highly skilled work force; employees gain through the investments
companies make in their human capital.'
Such a new psychological contract has important implications for the
question of who owns trade secrets after the termination of employment.
In addition to the express contracts of covenants not to compete, which
might define post-employment relations, there are also implied psychologi-
cal contracts full of subtle exchanges of productivity for training, of flexi-
ble employment with the risk of termination for the accumulation of skills
which might make an ex-employee employable by another enterprise.
Stone urges us to read covenants not to compete and trade secret cases us-
ing the lenses of the psychological contract. 9 What was exchanged? What
were the expectations of both parties-the employer and the employee?
Who feels wronged when expectations were breached, and---especially
important for its normative implications-how should courts respond to
this sense of injury? Stone tells us that the current judicial approaches to
the ownership of information are out of step with the new psychological
employment contract.2" She urges a rethinking of legal doctrine that takes
into account whether or not, expressly or implicitly, the promise of skills
training was represented as a benefit of employment, and therefore em-
ployees should not be restrained from exploiting the information-the
knowledge at work-they have obtained.2'
Lawyers tell stories. Good lawyers spin out compelling ones. Kathe-
rine Stone's work provides us with masterful narratives about how em-
ployers came to embrace the new psychological contract, and why the shift
from employee vesting in the workplace to the recasualization of work is of
significant importance for understanding the control of information after
employment. From her vantage point as a scholar of labor law, Stone bal-
ances trade secret law on the fulcrum of employment relations and con-
tract. However, I want to suggest a different story--one which is about the
relationship between the owner and the object, and with proprietary ideas
about property at its very core. However, unlike Stone, I will focus on the
importance of intellectual property law in establishing expectations. I will
suggest that adopting equitable doctrines embedded in property law allows
courts to curb an ever growing solicitude to trade secret protection and to
establish a more reasonable equilibrium between employee and employer
stakes in proprietary information.
17 Id. at 734.
isId. at 735.
19 Id. at 724.
20 ld. at 738.
21 Id. at 756.
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In Part I1 of this brief Essay, I describe how corporations seeking to
uncover new assets focused on the capacity of owners to establish trade
secrets by safeguarding their secrecy. This aspect of trade secret law,
where the spotlight is on policing rather than creating value, led to a rein-
vigorating of the property paradigm in trade secret doctrine. In contrast to
other forms of intellectual property, trade secrets become property only if
third-party access is vigilantly policed. This creates a powerful incentive
for businesses to monetize trade secrets through erecting more rigorous
procedures for protecting them. As suggested with the narrative of the
dismissed employee, the policing requirements for trade secrets-main-
taining protocols for monitoring the dissemination of information; requir-
ing periodic warnings to employees and signed covenants; and the threat of
post-employment legal action-has led to a psychological atmosphere
marked by heightened suspicion. I want to turn Stone's narrative on its
head. It is not the changing employment patterns alone that define the
bonds of loyalty. In my counter-narrative, law has a constitutive power to
shape how employers and employees relate to each other. The irony of
trade secret doctrine, as it emerges in the shadow of property law, is that it
incorporates a tort-based concern with breach of trust in service of a prop-
erty theory, which constantly ratchets up distrust in the workplace.
Part I suggests a normative solution to this problem. Drawing upon
the social relations theory of property, I suggest that defining the scope of
covenants not to compete and trade secrets as proprietary in terms of the
relationship to others-employees, competitors, and the public welfare
interest-serves to create proper limits to the scope of employer demands
for a capacious trade secret doctrine founded upon their discovery of trade
secrets as new property. Much bf this argument relies upon uncovering the
equitable roots of trade secret law. The relationship of the property to each
stakeholder-the core of the social relations 1roperty approach-suggests
that courts must set expectations for loyalty dependent upon the uses of the
trade secrets by employers with the labor and commercial markets. Two
recent cases show how equitable understandings of the social relations
between the parties might apply to both types of cases-the old psycho-
logical contract of long-term employment and the new psychological con-
tract of employee mobility.
II. TRADE SECRETS AS SELF-HELP INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States found itself facing
an increasingly weak competitive position as an industrial power. It turned
to a series of multilateral treaties, such as the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Tariffs and Trade ("TRIPS") component of General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") in order to police intellectual property pi-
2002]
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racy and to secure potential markets for its intellectual property assets.
Moreover, the United States, as a country well-to-do in both overall eco-
nomic output and marketable intellectual property resources, claimed that a
strengthening of international intellectual property rights would serve as an
economic motor on a global basis.22 Focusing on intellectual property as-
sets, the United States was concerned with trademark, patent, and, espe-
cially, copyright. However, corporations were soon to adopt the idea that
intellectual property might play a leading role in asserting their economic
worth to investors. Consultants remind companies that their major assets
are often not in real estate or industrial equipment, but in the knowledge
required to run businesses. Indeed, the Brookings Institute has estimated
that fifty to eighty-five percent of the value of a business may reside in its
intangible assets, including trademarks and trade secrets.2
In the last decade, intellectual property assets have become a frequent
topic for seminars. 24 Rust-belt industrial corporations,25 as well as informa-
tion economy businesses, turned to valuing their knowledge assets to at-
tract investors and leveraging these assets. In part, the idea of trade secrets
as assets was fostered by new start-ups, and especially biotechnology com-
panies, which chose to create portfolios of trade secrets rather than pursue
the much more expensive route of protection through patent. In part, in-
formation asset management as a whole fits in perfectly with managerial
models of corporations, where internal efficiencies could be heightened by
identifying the economic potential of each part of the company. Moreover,
it was easier to create claims to trade secret value because a trade secret
required the company to protect this information rather than to create it.26
22 Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism. Anticommons, Property and BioPiracy in the (Not-so-Brave) New
World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 22-
23 (1998).
23 Margaret M. Blair, New Ways Needed to Assess New Economy, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2000, at
7B, LEXIS, News Library, Lat File.24 See, e.g., Section of Intellectual Prop. Law, Am. Bar. Assoc., Homepage (listing upcoming in-
tellectual property protection seminars), at http'//www.abanet.org/intelprop/home.html (last visited
Mar. 12, 2002) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review); TechNet, The World Bank, Upcoming
TechNet Seminars (listing intellectual property protection seminars from 1996-2002), at
http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/technet/seminars.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002) (on file with the
Connecticut Law Review).
25 The "rust belt" is the "economic region in the NE quadrant of the United States, focused on the
Midwester... states of lilinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio, as well as Pennsylvania." ENCYCLOPE-
DIA.COM, at http://www.encyclopedia.com/articles/1 1256.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2002) (on file with
the Connecticut Law Review).
26 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2000) ("[T]he term 'trade secret' means all forms and types of
financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information... memorialized physi-
cally, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if ... the owner thereof has taken
reasonable measures to keep such information secret.") (emphasis added), with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994
& Supp V 2000) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
[Vol. 34:787
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Many states enacted statutes codifying the traditional common law
definition of trade secrets as embodied in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.27
A trade secret is any "information, including a formula, pattern, compila-
tion, program, device, method, technique, or process, that... derives inde-
pendent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known..."28  It must be protected through reasonable efforts to maintain
its secrecy.29 Such a definition is capacious indeed. It includes business
methods, strategies, customer information, and technical knowledge."
Trade secret assets might be claimed by businesses of all sorts, not simply
companies with a stake in new technologies.
Since most information has some value, actual or potential, the prong
of reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy has become the more important
one for determining corporate policy. Reasonable secrecy has become a
mechanism for courts to determine whether the property is worth protect-
ing.3" It has been suggested that the investment of companies in maintain-
ing secrecy-the costs of security and the economic burden of inhibiting
the free flow of information within corporations-provides an evidentiary
showing of the information's value.32 However, protection of trade secrets
has become routinized through the mechanisms described at the beginning
of this essay. As identity cards, the supervision of the dissemination of
information within the business, covenants-not-to competes and potential
notice of trade secret liability became standardized, the costs of maintain-
ing secrecy was simply a part of day-to-day business operations. Compa-
nies might establish more extensive protocols for the policing of informa-
& Supp V. 1999) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.") (emphasis added).27 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-51(d).
"(Tirade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, de-
vice, method, technique, process, drawing, cost data or customer list that: (1) Derives inde-
pendent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not be-
ing readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and (2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the cir-
cumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Id.
28 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990 & Supp. 2001).
2 9 Id. To be a trade secret, the information must be "the subject of efforts that are reasonable un-
der the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."3 0 See. e.g., supra note 28.
31 See, e.g., Maharis v. Omaha Vaccine Co., No. 90-56356, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14588, at *11
(finding "on the issue of reasonable secrecy efforts, there was sufficient evidence presented to the jury
to support its conclusion that the lists [at issue] were trade secrets"); IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp.,
165 F. Supp. 2d 812, 820 (W.D. Wis. 2001) ("Confidential information that does not rise to the level of
trade secret is by definition either worthless, generally known or readily ascertainable, or not the sub-
ject of reasonable secrecy efforts.") (emphasis added).
32 Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1991) CThe require-
ment ofreasonable efforts [to maintain secrecy] has both evidentiary and remedial significance....").
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tion with remarkably little scrutiny about whether it was a worthwhile in-
vestment for the particular knowledge protected.
What constitutes reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy? Reasonable
was interpreted as not creating burdensome costs that might interfere with
the competitive capability of companies.3 3 A company might widely circu-
late mechanical drawings of spare parts among employees who are rou-
tinely called upon to provide replacements.34 Trade secrets, therefore, were
very different from other species of intellectual property. Trademarks must
be used in commerce.35 If the trademark is weak, it may be challenged by
the crowding of competitors and imitators in the marketplace; or, if it is
registered, through oppositions filed in inter partes proceedings.36 Copy-
right is established through being fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion. 37  Patents must undergo a rigorous process of registration-
demonstrating, utility, novelty, and non-obviousness.38 In this sense, trade
secrets may be considered self-help intellectual property. The trade secret
rights are established, to a large part, not by affirmatively creating an ex-
pression or invention-like trademark, copyright, or patent-but through
policing secrecy. 39 A business evidences a trade secret by being sure not to
disclose information that has value to unnecessary parties, and to be vigi-
lant with those who have access to the information.
The breach in trade secret cases often comes from those who are in a
relationship of privity with the owner of the information,' and therefore
contract doctrine has played a pivotal role in determining duties of confi-
dentiality of employees and third parties.4 Nevertheless, the relational
duties not to breach secrecy emerge from the owner's requirement to estab-
lish control over the dissemination of information.42 If the owner of the
33 Id. at 180 ("If trade secrets are protected only if their owners take extravagant, productivity-
impairing measures to maintain their secrecy, the incentive to invest resources in discovering more
efficient methods of production will be reduced, and with it the amount of invention.").3 4 See generally id.
35 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000) ("The owner of a trademark used in commerce may request registra-
tion of its trademark on the principal register .. ") (emphasis added).
36 Id. § 1063.
37 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.") (emphasis added).
38 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (utility), 102 (novelty) & 103 (non-obviousness).
39 See supra notes 29-30.
40See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991) (employ-
ees).
41 2-6 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 6.01 (Matthew Bender & Co. ed.,
2001); 2-7 MILGRIM, supra, § 7.01.
42 See supra notes 29-35.
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information wishes to make knowledge available to the public, or to over-
look its use by competitors, he or she may certainly do so, and waive prop-
erty rights in knowledge. The relational duty-the responsibility of the ex-
employee, for example, to the employer-emerges as a consequence of the
employer's legal need to establish control in order to ensure that the infor-
mation is indeed property.43 Thus, property, not contract, is at the center of
trade secret doctrine.
In 1917, the Supreme Court's well-known decision, E.. du Pont de
Nemors v. Masland,4 shifted the lens of trade secret towards the breach.
As the Court stated: "the property may be denied, but the confidence can-
not be."' 5 Again, addressing the issue over sixty years later, the Court in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,"6 called trade secret property worthy of the pro-
tection of the Takings Clause.47 Nowhere has this property aspect of trade
secret been more clearly seen than in the first full-scale establishment of
federal protection for trade secrets, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.8
The Economic Espionage Act provides for criminal prosecution of indi-
viduals whosoever "appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by
fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret."'49 Using a computer to
download a trade secret without authorization or, alternatively, destroying
a trade secret so as to make it no longer available to the bona fide owner,
violates the statute." Appropriation alone-absent commercial use or even
disclosure-may trigger criminal liability.5 Here, the trade secret is con-
ceived of as a species of property, and the breach of fiduciary duties re-
cedes into the background.
Drawing upon the Midas touch of an increasingly deferential trade se-
cret law-both state and, more recently, federal-businesses saw them-
selves as surrounded by information that might be transformed into gold.
Information is property. Property is an asset-and these monetized assets
43 1-5 MILGRIM, supra note 42, § 5.02.
Extensive analysis has been devoted to the recognition of a property right in a trade secret.
Analytically, it is this property right upon which protection is predicated. This property
right permits the employer-owner to communicate or otherwise entrust confidential infor-
mation to or with employees. Such communications are protected disclosure and do not ne-
gate or dilute the owner's trade secret.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
44 244 US 100 (1917).
5 d. at 102.
46 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
47 Id. at 1003. Miguel Deutch, The Property Concept of Trade Secrets in Anglo-American Law:
An Ongoing Debate, 31 U. RICH. L REV. 313,321 (1997); Suellen Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure Trade
Secrets Disputes: Dissolution of Concurrent Property Interests, 40 STAN. L. REV. 519, 536 (1988).
48 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000).
49 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(1).
5o Id. § 1831(a)(2).
51 Id. § 1831(a)(1).
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might be leveraged with investors. As with real property, owners had the
power, and indeed the duty, to exclude. Since the probative evidence of
the value of the trade secrets depended upon policing, there was a powerful
incentive for owners to tend the boundaries around the trade secrets them-
selves. The scarce resource of knowledge would maintain its value
through artificially enforced scarcity. Not surprisingly, since the same
policing mechanisms might be shared without any additional cost to protect
both core proprietary knowledge and information which may or may not be
proprietary, businesses made ever greater claim to the ownership of trade
secrets.
The problem of extending the borders around a core property stake is
common in intellectual property regimes. It may be illustrated through the
metaphor of a field. Surrounding fields, which border the property tn all
sides, cannot hem in the owner of the field and establish property stakes
immediately up to the boundaries of the original field. Trademark owners,
for example, are able to protect not simply against the use in commerce of
the identical mark, but also against any mark that might cause a likelihood
of confusion. 2 The trademark holder has the power to bar others from
using similar marks. Copyright does not just protect against literal in-
fringement. Among the rights of the copyright holder is the right of adap-
tation, which prevents others from making derivative works with only
slight modifications of the original.53 Patent law includes the doctrine of
equivalence, under which products or processes not literally within a claim,
but which perform substantially the same function and means to obtain the
function, infringe.54
Trade secret, too, has such extensions beyond the scope of the infor-
mation itself. Perhaps the best example is the inevitable disclosure doc-
trine. The inevitable disclosure doctrine allows courts to enjoin actual or
threatened misappropriation of trade secrets, and restrain an ex-employee
who was privy to proprietary information from taking a new employment
situation in a related field, because of a likelihood of divulging this infor-
mation in his or her new job.55 However, as the well-known and troubling
52 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) (providing a remedy for the trademark owner against anyone: "who
shall ... use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services
on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion").
53 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000) (providing copyright holder with the exclusive right to "to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work").
54 See e.g., Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222, 230 (1880) ("It may be con-
ceded the patentee is protected against equivalents for any part of his invention. He would be, whether
he had claimed them or not.").
55 See PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1268-69 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear
Communications Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353, 357 (7th Cir. 1987)).
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PepsiCo v. Redmond 6 demonstrates, the cost of such an extension is exter-
nalized to the employee. PepisCo sued William E. Redmond, Jr., general
manager of its Northern California unit, seeking to enjoin him from assum-
ing new duties as a vice-president of field operations for Quaker Oats,
which was the maker of the beverages Gatorade and Snapple." Although
Redmond had not signed a covenant not to compete, PepsiCo claimed he
had extensive knowledge of its future strategies. 8 The court found that the
value of the proprietary information, set against the backdrop of intense
competition in the soft-drink industry and the fact that Redmond could not
help but draw upon that information, would lead to the inevitable breach of
confidentiality, and enjoined Redmond from assuming his post at Quaker. 9
Despite the remarkable limitation on the liberty interest of Redmond, this
case is not outside the mainstream of trade secret doctrine.6°
What alternative conceptions exist in trade secret doctrine to limit this
increasing solicitude to the property rights of employers? How does a
property-based theory work to mediate between the property rights of a
company in proprietary information and the limitations placed upon the
mobility of labor? How can we distinguish between the knowledge, gen-
eral and specific, derived from an employer and the skills honed through
the diligence of an employee? In short, the discovery of trade secrets as a
new property, with broad rights granted to those who expend resources to
maintain secrecy, has led to a tilting of rights in favor of employers, and an
ever more capacious sense of entitlement. How does the property-based
theory cure the very problem it has exacerbated?
III. PROPERTY, SOCIAL RELATIONS, AND EQuITY
A number of property theorists have turned to the social-relations ap-
proach to property.6 This approach challenges traditional assertions of
property rights as autonomous from the way property is used between indi-
viduals, and asserts its role in establishing both mutual dependencies and
unequal bargaining power.62 Trade secret doctrine itself has often seen its
role as establishing social relations. In E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
56 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
57 Id. at 1265.
58 See id. at 1264-65.
5 9 See generally id.
60 See, e.g., Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (enjoining employee
from working for competitor based on the inevitable disclosure doctrine).
61 See generally Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611
(1988) [hereinafter Singer, The Reliance Interest]; JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE
PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 197-216 (Yale University Press 2000).
62 See Singer, The Reliance Interest, supra note 62, at 635-36 (describing some limitations of an
"individualistic property and contract theory").
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Christopher,63 for example, an important goal of trade secret law was
maintaining commercial morality. Dupont claimed as a trade secret a
process for producing methanol that was to be used in a new plant being
constructed in Texas." The Christophers, free-lance photographers, were
hired by a third party, presumably a competitor, to fly over the site and take
aerial photographs.65 Although there was no relationship between the par-
ties, the court found a breach commercial morality that applies even absent
privity." As with persons, corporations may have a right to commercial
privacy. However, if courts have been ready to use a relational approach in
cases of industrial espionage, they have been less willing to do so when
considering the relationships between parties who have a stake in proprie-
tary information created in an employment setting.
What relationships should courts consider? For example, courts might
see proprietary information as the joint creation of the employer and the
employee. Both have invested in its creation and therefore might be said to
have a property stake.67 More significantly, it should be considered how
the parties utilize the proprietary information within the context of social
relations. The threat of enforcing a covenant not to compete barring future
employment in the area where the employee's skills are strongest; the at-
mosphere of suspicion, which reinforces power relationships in the work-
place; and the extent of civil and criminal sanctions all suggest that a nar-
row understanding of the traditional model of an employer entitlement in
trade secret, absent any reference to the effect on social relations within the
labor market, might have a coercive effect on employees.
Trade secret law is frequently Zlescribed as an equitable doctrine.6"
First, courts have occasionally reached to the issue of reasonableness to
suggest that covenants that suffer from over-breadth in terms of geographic
or duration restrictiveness may be found void.69 The Uniform Trade Se-
63 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
64Id. at 1013-14.
65 Id. at 1013.
66 Id. at 1015 (noting that Texas courts recognize and enforce high standards of"commercial mo-
rality").
67 See generally Suellen Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secrets Disputes: Dissolutions of
Concurrent Property Interests, 40 STAN. L. REv. 519 (1988).
68See generally Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in
Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800-1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441
(2001).
69 See. e.g., Harvest Ins. Agency v. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co., 492 N.E.2d 686, 689-90 (Ind. 1986)
(holding a non-competition agreement void and observing that "the determination of reasonableness...
focuses on ... time, pace and the types of activity proscribed"); Protocomm Corp. v. Fluent, Inc., No.
93-0518, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *21 (E.D. Penn. 1995) (identifying duration and geographic scope
as two of the factors to be considered in determining "the reasonableness ofa noncompetition cove-
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crets Act, a model for many state statutes, creates a "reasonable under the
circumstances" standard for the secrecy that must be maintained. This
has been used as a requirement for companies to invest in secrecy mainte-
nance programs; but immunizes them, if physical circumstances cause the
protections to seem too costly (i.e., it is difficult to protect a plant under
construction from aerial surveillance or there is an economic need to have
widely distributed blueprints).7 However, it may also be that certain types
of secrecy maintenance programs might be found unreasonable and unnec-
essary because they represent an overly capacious claiming of trade secret
entitlements.72
Second, there is a relationship between the business and its competi-
tors. As the Christopher court stated, trade secret is meant to protect fun-
damental commercial morality.73 However, this does not mean simply
protecting against industrial espionage. Employers might use covenants
not to compete as a means to restrict the future employment of ex-
employees in order to improve their own competitive position in regard to
competitors. To bind employees to restrictive covenants absent the reason-
able need for protection of proprietary information has been found by some
courts as a mechanism to hold employees "virtual hostages of their em-
ployers."74 Courts could expand upon this equitable analysis of the em-
ployer's uses of covenants not to compete and trade secret law.
Third, as a number of courts have suggested, there is a public welfare
interest in employee mobility.7" Covenants not to compete, and trade se-
cret law in general, must be understood against this need. Employee mo-
bility allows for the transfer of ideas and practices from one corporation to
another, and thus increases competitiveness. It also provides for the most
efficient use of human resources. In Metro Traffic Control v. Shadow
ant's restraint").7 0 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990 & Supp. 2001).
71 See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.2d at 1017 ("Reasonable precautions against preda-
tory eyes we may require, but an impenetrable fortress is an unreasonable requirement, and we are not
disposed to burden industrial investors with such a duty in order to protect the fruits of their efforts.").72 See Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. Forest Flavors Int'l, 26 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 (M.D. Tenn. 1998)
(holding that a routine practice of having employees sign contracts promising not to divulge confiden-
tial information will not warrant trade secret protection unless the information is secret, business related
and affords the employer a competitive advantage).
73 E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.2d at 1015-16 (describing espionage to obtain trade se-
crets as running afoul of"commercial morality").
74 Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590,594 (N.Y. 1976).
75 See, e.g., APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. Access Direct Telemarketing, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 852, 868
(N.D. Iowa 1997) ("[T]he public has an interest in ensuring the free movement of employees from one
company to another in order to hone competition.. ."); Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 240
N.W.2d 710, 719 (Mich. 1976) (reasoning that overbroad enforcement of a non-compete clause creates
an negative effect on the "public interest" by "deterring competition and employee mobility. .. ").
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Traffic,76 for example, the court determined that the attempt to restrict the
mobility of radio air traffic announcers was motivated by the fact that these
employees had become local personalities, and not by a desire to prevent
the disclosure of trade secrets, and the court denied injunctive relief.77
A social relations approach to trade secret, therefore, depends less
upon what the expectations of the party are-express or implied contracts,
as Stone recomendsT--and addresses instead the equitable property
rights embedded in trade secret. According to the social relations property-
based approach, courts would recognize the sense of property entitlements
employers have for proprietary information, but would balance these with
the equitable requirements of employees, competitors, and public welfare
as a whole. This requires looking at trade secrets within the context of a
broad array of facts concerning the employment relationship, and not sim-
ply evaluating the value and the policing of the proprietary information.
Expectations of the scope of trade secrets would be altered by setting legal
limits to misuse.
Such a property approach incorporates Stone's keen psychological in-
sights into the changing nature of the workplace. Both old psychologies
and new might be treated appropriately. Two cases best point to the use of
social relations to determine post-employment restrictions. The first is the
case of Elm City Cheese v. Federico.79 Frederico was accountant and vice-
president of Elm City Cheese, a small family-owned Connecticut business
which manufactured hard cheese from milk whose date-of-sale had ex-
pired." Elm City Cheese had done little to protect its trade secrets. Em-
ployees did not sign covenants and evidence presented concerning the
maintenance of secrecy described a locked filing cabinet.8 ' The defendant,
Federico, was like a family member in the eyes of the company's owners
and, as an accountant, he was entrusted with information about customers
and business procedures.82 He had known the family since he was seven
years old. Over time, Frederico assumed various duties, including, signa-
tory of the checkbook, day-to-day operations, and was named an executor
of the owner's will.83 In 1995, immediately after the distribution of profits
for the previous year, he left the company and secured a bank loan based
on the overall business plan of Elm City Cheese in order to compete within
76 22 Cal. App. 4"' 853 (1994).
77 Id. at 862-63.
78 See generally Stone, supra note 7.
79 251 Conn. 59,752 A.2d 1037 (1999).
80 Elm City Cheese, 752 A.2d at 1040-41.
81 Id. at 1050-51.
8 2 Id. at 1040-41.
83 Id. at 1040.
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the same niche market." Although the court found little effort on the com-
pany's part to protect its trade secret, and the component parts of the busi-
ness plan may not themselves have been trade secrets, there nevertheless
appeared to be a trade secret in the whole. 5 The loyalty of the employee-
the traditional social relations between a family and a trusted family friend
who also served as an employee-was breached.86 Finding Frederico had
abused the trust of his employer and appropriated trade secrets, the court
issued a three-year non-compete injunction and awarded $300,000 in puni-
tive damages as well as attorney fees.
If Frederico represents Stone's old psychological contract, the second
case, Earthweb, Inc. v. Schlack, s epitomizes the new psychological con-
tract. Mark Schlack worked for Earthweb, a company founded in 1994
which provided on-line products and services directed towards intemet
technology professionals, where he was vice-president of Worldwide Con-
tent, overseeing acquisition of content.8 9 Within less than a year, Schlack
left Earthweb for Itworld.com, another web-based publishing venture with
largely in-house content.90 Schlack had signed a restrictive covenant for
twelve months.9' However, the court found that Schlack did not misappro-
priate specific information from his prior employer, but had acquired gen-
eral skills in the course of that employment.92 Since a covenant not to
compete must be reasonable and must not unduly restrict the mobility of
ex-employees, even this period was deemed too long for the rapidly chang-
ing world of the Internet.93 The court voided the restrictive covenant.94
Similarly, in Doubleclick v. Henderson," the court reduced a covenant not
to compete to a mere six months because of rapid changes in the high-tech
industry.96
In both these cases-reflecting the old and the new psychological con-
tracts-courts determined the scope of trade secrets within the context of
4Id. at 1041-42.
85 Id. at 1044-45.
86 Id at 1052.
87 Id. at 1043, 1058.
88 71 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), injunction denied, 2000 US App. Lexis 11446 (2d Cir.
2000).89 Id. at 302-03.
9 0 Id. at 303, 306.
91 Id. at 306-07.
92 Id. at 315-16.
93Id. at 313 ("[T]his court finds that the one-year duration of Earthweb's restrictive covenant is
too long given the dynamic nature of this industry...").94 Id. at 317.
95 No. 116914/97, 1997 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 577 (N.Y. Gen. Term Nov. 5, 1999).9 6 Id. at *23 (reasoning that a six month injunction would be sufficient in light of"the speed with
which the Internet advertising industry apparently changes...").
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expectations. But they also set the expectations. Long-term employees
must be deferential to the equitable needs of employers for the protection
of proprietary information even where the policing mechanism is minimal;
mobile employees might utilize such information where the relationship
suggests a flow of knowledge is a commonplace in the employment market
since all property, no matter how well protected, has limitations implied in
ownership.
IV. CONCLUSION
To call for the reinvigorating of equitable property doctrine within
trade secrets is indeed to ask for courts to recognize something they have
acknowledged for a long time. However, the core property nature of in-
formation does not simply provide for proprietary rights. It also means the
limitations of entitlement. Thinking about social relations has important
implications for the sort of relations we seek to establish as well as for the
recognition of expectations in the relationships themselves. Much ink has
been spilled concerning the role of intellectual property in setting the con-
tours of civil society. Mostly this has concerned the creation of a robust
public sphere of expression independent of government influence.97 Nev-
ertheless, civil society exists within various niches and relationships, in-
cluding the employment relationship. Perhaps one of the goals of trade
secrets should include a turn away from the atmosphere of distrust created
through self-help policing in order to establish property rights, and to reor-
der the balance of power between employers and employees. Equitable
concerns with misuse of information by either party reflects this return to
the idea that intellectual property, like real property or chattel, must be
used within the framework of competing claims.
Coleridge once derided the telescope for altering the relationship of the
eye to the senses but leaving the object untouched. Trade secrets might be
established with different expectations under different psychological con-
tracts. However, if we are to recover the equitable dimension of trade se-
crets we need to rethink the terms of entitlement-in short, we need to alter
the proprietary object as well.
97 See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE
L.J. 283 (1996).
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